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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
HOSTILE USE. The land involved was originally one
parcel but the owner divided the parcel into two equal
parcels and sold the west half first. The new owner (west
side owner) erected a fence on what the owner thought, as
informed by the real estate agent, was the property line but
which was actually 60 feet on to the owner’s property. The
owner did not otherwise improve the property and allowed
the real estate agent to pasture cattle on the property. The
east half of the property was purchased later with the fence
already in place; therefore, the new owners (east side
owners) also thought the fence was the actual boundary. The
east side owners also did not improve their property and
allowed the real estate agent to pasture horses on the
property, including the disputed strip. The only other
activity on the strip was watering by the sprinkler system by
the east side owners. A flood cut away much of the west
side property and carried away some of the fence and some
of the disputed strip.  The east side owners leased the house
to the real estate agent as a residence and for a ranch for the
agent’s cattle. The cattle were tethered because of the
broken fence.  The east side owners then sold their parcel to
the plaintiff through the same real estate agent, who
informed the plaintiff that the fence was the true boundary.
The plaintiff replaced the fence after the flood damage was
restored.  The west side parcel was then sold to the
defendant with the former west side owner taking a deed of
trust on the property.  Three years later, the defendant had a
survey done which finally showed that the fence was 60 feet
on the west parcel and the plaintiff filed a quiet title action
as to the defendant and as to the holder of the deed of trust.
Although the plaintiff had clearly adversely possessed the
disputed strip after their possession, the length of possession
was insufficient to acquire title by adverse possession;
therefore, the plaintiff needed to demonstrate adverse
possession by the previous possessors. The defendant
argued that because the real estate agent’s lease of the land
did not include using the land for cattle, the agent’s use of
the disputed strip could not be considered as adverse
possession by the previous owners. The court held that the
previous owners did not restrict the agent’s use of the land;
therefore, the agent’s use of the disputed strip to graze
tethered cattle was sufficient adverse possession to attribute
that possession to the previous owner and could be tacked
onto the plaintiff’s adverse possession. The court also held,
however, that the adverse possession did not include the
portion of the disputed strip which was washed away in the
flood, because no use of that portion was made by the agent
and the washed away area became open range visited by
cattle from several other ranches. The deed of trust holder
argued that the adverse possession did not apply to the lien
on the property. The court agreed that title by adverse
possession could not accrue against the lienholder because
the lien holder had no cause of action against the adverse
possessor until the debtor defaulted on the loan. Berryhill v.
Moore, 881 P.2d 1182 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS . Prior to filing for
bankruptcy, the debtor was involved in a suit against a
manufacturer of cattle feed for damages resulting from
defective feed. Prior to 90 days before filing for bankruptcy,
the debtor assigned to a creditor a portion of the anticipated
damages. The debtor received the damage award within the
90 days before filing for bankruptcy and the creditor
received the portion of the award before the bankruptcy case
commenced. The court held that the transfer to the creditor
was not avoidable as a preferential transfer because the
effective date of the transfer was the date the assignment of
the damage award was executed, not the date the award was
paid to the creditor. In re Wagner, 173 B.R. 916 (N.D.
Iowa 1994), aff’g, 144 B.R. 430 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1992).
ESTATE PROPERTY. The debtor’s mother had
created an inter vivos trust with a one-third remainder for
the debtor. The mother died one month after the debtor filed
for Chapter 7 and the debtor became entitled to one-third of
the trust property. The debtor claimed the interest in the
trust as exempt under Section 541(a)(5)(A), arguing that the
trust property was not received “by bequest, devise or
inheritance.”  The court held that recent U.S. Supreme Court
and Second Circuit Court of Appeals rulings required a
“plain meaning” interpretation of Section 541 and that
receipt of property through a remainder interest in an inter
vivos trust was not receipt of property by bequest, devise or
inheritance.  However, the court held that the debtor’s
interest in the trust was estate property under Section
541(a)(1) which included all interests in property held by
the debtor. The holding is not clear as to whether the court
intended that all of the debtor’s share of the trust was
included or just the value of the remainder interest at the
time of the filing of the petition. In re Crandall, 173 B.R.
836 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994).
EXECUTORY CONTRACTS. The debtor entered into
an installment contract to purchase a meat-processing
business, including real and personal property and goodwill.
The debtor received possession of all assets and the seller
agreed to satisfy all existing liens against the property and to
hold the debtor harmless for any liabilities which arose prior
to the sale. The seller retained title to the property until all
payments were made. The debtor initially filed a motion to
assume the contract but the debtor’s Chapter 12 plan
provided for payments only to the extent of the value of the
property, treating the contract as a security agreement. The
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seller argued that the debtor could not treat the contract as a
security agreement in the plan once the contract had been
assumed. The court held that the debtor was not estopped
from changing the characterization of the contract because
the seller had not detrimentally relied on the assumption of
the contract. In addition, the court held that a debtor could
not change the nature of the contract, if it was a security
agreement, merely by assuming the contract; therefore, the
only relevant issue was whether the contract was an
executory contract or a security agreement. The court held
that the installment contract was a security agreement
because the only remaining duties were the payment of
money by the debtor and the transfer of title by the seller. In
re Fitch, 174 B.R. 96 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1994).
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS.  The debtors filed for Chapter 7
and claimed a homestead exemption for their mobile home.
The home was subject to several judgment liens but the
debtors did not make any attempt to avoid the judicial liens
against the homestead. After the case was closed, the
debtors sold the mobile home. The closing company paid
the proceeds to the judgment creditors and the debtor
petitioned the Bankruptcy Court to reopen the case to allow
avoidance of the judicial liens. The court held that because
the homestead proceeds had been distributed to the
creditors, the judicial liens could no longer be avoided. In
re Kudrna, 173 B.R. 934 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1994).
The debtor claimed a homestead exemption and sought
to avoid a judgment lien against the house. The Bankruptcy
Court had avoided the entire $92,000 lien, although the
exemption amount was only $12,000.  The creditor argued
that the house was already exempt from the lien under Utah
law; therefore, no impairment existed. The District Court
reversed, holding that the homestead exemption was not
impaired because the lien could not affect the homestead
exemption under state law.  In addition, the court held that
the entire lien could not be avoided but that the lien could
have been avoided only to the extent of the impaired
exemption amount. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed on both points. In re Sanders, 39 F.3d 258 (10th
Cir. 1994), aff’g, 156 B.R. 667 (D. Utah 1993).
HOUSEHOLD GOODS. The debtors claimed a variety
of household items as exempt under Idaho Code § 11-
605(a)(1). Using a “reasonably necessary” standard, the
court allowed one VCR, one television, patio furniture, an
entertainment cabinet, and a stereo as exempt household
goods. The court did not allow an exemption for sport
equipment, a second VCR,  two other televisions, and one
computer system. The court noted that in 1989 VCRs were
considered luxury items but that in 1994, the use of VCRs
was so pervasive as to make at least one VCR a necessity in
a household. Query, how soon will computers change from
luxury items to necessities? The court did allow a tools of
the trade exemption for another computer system because
the debtor’s employer provided the debtor with software for
the computer so that the debtor could perform some
employment duties at home, even though the computer and
home work were not required as a condition of employment.
In re Biancavilla, 173 B.R. 930 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1994).
TRUSTEE FEE . The debtor owned a farm which was
subject to two deeds of trust. The debtor filed for Chapter 11
and sold the farm under approval of the Bankruptcy Court.
The sale proceeds were paid to the first deed of trust holder
and the remainder of the proceeds were distributed through
an escrow account administered by the debtor’s attorney.
The case was then dismissed with the court ordering
payment of a $400 trustee fee under 28 U.S.C. § 1930
because the only disbursements were made directly to
secured creditors. The District Court reversed, holding that
“disbursements” under Section 1930 included all payments
made from the estate. St. Angelo v. Victoria Farms, Inc.,
38 F.3d 1525 (9th Cir. 1994).
    CHAPTER 11   -ALM § 13.03.*
ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE. The debtors operated
a cattle-on-gain operation which included renting pasture to
a third party. The debtors’ Chapter 11 plan provided for
payment of 52 percent of the unsecured claims and retention
of the debtors’ farm. The plan provided that the pasture
lessee would make all due rent payments immediately to
infuse the operation with almost $70,000 in cash. An
unsecured creditor objected to the plan as violating the
absolute priority rule because the debtors were retaining
property but paying only 52 percent of unsecured claims.
The debtor argued that the $70,000 payment was new
capital invested by the debtors. The court held that the
absolute priority rule was not satisfied because the due lease
payments were already estate property and could not qualify
as new investment by the debtors. In re Short, 173 B.R.
946 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1994).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
CLAIMS. The debtor had filed a previous Chapter 13
case which was dismissed without discharge. The IRS filed
a claim for taxes in the second case and included interest
accrued during the first bankruptcy case. The debtor
objected to the portion of the claim for interest during the
first case. The court held that the dismissal of the first case
without discharge put the debtor and all creditors in the
same position as if no previous case had been filed;
therefore, the interest which accrued during the previous
case was allowable. In re Irons, 173 B.R. 910 (Bankr.
E.D. Ark. 1994).
The debtors claimed a homestead exemption for a
mobile home located on their real property and which was
subject to federal tax liens. The debtors argued that the tax
liens should be “stripped down” to the value of their equity
in the home. The court held that, under Dewsnup v. Timm,
502 U.S. 410 (1992), the lien could not be reduced to the
value of the collateral. In re Place, 173 B.R. 912 (Bankr.
E.D. Ark. 1994).
CONTRACTS
BREACH. The defendant owned farm land in Nebraska
and entered into a written contract with the plaintiff for the
plaintiff to operate the farm. The contract provided for a per
acre fee plus a share of the profits. The contract also
provided for written extensions and the contract was
extended three times. In the fourth year, the farm incurred
substantial losses and the defendant notified the plaintiff
that the contract would be terminated, paid the plaintiff
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$1,000 and provided no written extension of the contract.
However, the defendant allowed the plaintiff to finish
harvesting the crop that year and orally agreed to allow the
plaintiff to operate the farm an additional year on a fee per
acre basis only. The plaintiff sued for breach of contract in
that the defendant did not pay the entire fee per acre nor any
share of the profits. The plaintiff argued that the original
contract was extended by the oral agreements. The court
held that the original contract liability of both parties was
resolved by an accord and satisfaction. The court also held
that the original contract was not extended by the oral
agreements because the contact provided that an extension
could be made only in writing and both parties provided
partial performance in accord with the oral agreement. The
court upheld the defendant’s counterclaim for damages
under the oral contract because the evidence showed that the
crop losses resulted from the plaintiff’s failure to plant early
enough, to irrigate the crops and to control weeds.  The
defendant’s losses were offset only by the amount of per
acre fee not paid by the defendant. Lone Cedar Ranches,
Inc. v. Jandebeur, 523 N.W.2d 364 (Neb. 1994).
PASTURE LEASE. The plaintiff owned pasture land
and had agreed to allow the defendant’s corporation to
pasture the corporation’s horses on the pasture.  The
agreement was not put in writing and when the defendant
removed horses without paying the rent, the plaintiff sued
for the rent. The defendant argued that the lease was void
because it was not in writing. The court held that the
agreement did not amount to a lease of land because the
agreement did not transfer any interest in the property to the
defendant. In addition, the court held that the statute of
frauds would not apply because of partial performance of
the agreement by the parties. The trial court had awarded
damages against the sole shareholder of the defendant
corporation and the defendant argued on appeal that only the
corporation was liable for the rent. The court held that the
trial court properly ignored the corporation because the
defendant, as demonstrated by the defendant’s own
testimony, completely controlled the corporation and did not
treat it as a separate entity from the defendant’s property.
Ferguson v. Strader, 641 N.E.2d 728 (Ohio Ct. App.
1994).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
PEANUTS. The CCC has issued proposed regulations
establishing the minimum CCC sales price for 1995 crop of
additional peanuts for export at $400 per short ton. 60 Fed.
Reg. 381 (Jan. 4, 1995).
RURAL DEVELOPMENT. The defendant village
obtained a loan from the FmHA (now CFSA) for the repair
of its water treatment facility. Under regulations governing
such loans, the defendant enacted a loan resolution agreeing
to provide adequate service to all persons in the service area
and agreeing to obtain FmHA prior consent before refusing
new or existing service to such persons. The defendant
sought to increase the size of the village in order to qualify
as a city and passed an ordinance requiring nonresident
water customers to annex their property to the village in
order to continue receiving water and sewage service. The
plaintiffs were nonresidents in the water service area who
were denied existing or new water service because of their
refusal to annex their property to the village. The court held
that the annexing ordinance violated the loan resolution and
allowed the plaintiffs to sue for damages including
attorney’s fees. Wayne v. Village of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517
(6th Cir. 1994).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* A trust was established in 1970 by the will of the
taxpayers’ grandfather. The trust had the taxpayers’ parent
as life beneficiary and when that parent died, the trust
beneficial interest passed equally to the four taxpayers. The
trust provided that if the income was insufficient to meet the
needs of a beneficiary, the trustee could distribute trust
corpus to that beneficiary. The taxpayers divided the trust
into four trusts, one for each taxpayer. The resulting trusts
were identical to the original trust, including a provision that
the corpus of each trust could be invaded to support any
beneficiary of the trusts if the income of the separate trust
was insufficient to meet the needs of that beneficiary. The
original trust assets were distributed under state law which
required distribution based on the fair market value of the
trust assets and required distribution which fairly
represented the capital gain or loss accumulated on the
assets. The distribution of assets, however, did not equally
divide each asset. The IRS ruled that the partition of the
trust did not subject the pre-1986 trust to GSTT nor did the
taxpayers realize any gain or loss from the partition. Ltr.
Rul. 9451065, Sept. 28, 1994.
The decedent had created several trusts for the
decedent’s grandchildren and the grandchildren merged the
trusts so that each child was the beneficiary of one trust
instead of several trusts. The remaining trust retained the
same terms as the original trusts as to the assets involved in
the original trusts. The IRS ruled that the merger of the
trusts did not result in recognition of gain or loss to the
beneficiaries, did not affect the basis or holding periods of
the trust assets and did not subject the trusts to GSTT. Ltr.
Rul. 9452033, Sept. 30, 1994.
GIFT-ALM § 6.01.* The taxpayers were sisters and
were each a beneficiary of a trust established by their parent.
The trusts were interpreted by a state court to give each
beneficiary the inter vivos power to require the distribution
of all income and principal to the beneficiary’s descendants
or descendants of the parent, but not the beneficiary. The
taxpayers each requested the trustee of their trusts to
distribute the trust assets to the other sister. The IRS ruled
that because the taxpayers did not have the power to require
distributions of trust income and principal to the taxpayers’
themselves, their estates or their creditors, the taxpayers did
not possess general powers of appointment over trust
property. However, because each taxpayer had a beneficial
interest in the trust, the right to periodic distributions of
income and principal, the distributions to the other taxpayer
were taxable gifts to the extent of the value of these
beneficial interests. The IRS noted that the facts of this case
did not require application of the reciprocal transfer rules
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under United State v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969).
Ltr. Rul. 9451049, Sept. 22, 1994.
A number of family trusts owned 48 percent of the
common stock of a corporation. The trusts exchange the
common stock with a value of over $3.7 million for
preferred stock with a value of just over $780,000. The
remainder of the common stock was owned by one son. The
Court held that the recapitalization of the corporation
resulted in a gift to the son of the difference between the
value of the trusts’ stock before and after the recapitalization
because the recapitalization was made with donative intent
and was controlled by the family members. Saltzman v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-641.
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS-
ALM § 5.02[4].* The decedents, husband and wife, had
made inter vivos transfers of remainder interests in three
properties to their daughter for a small amount of cash and a
promissory note. The amount of cash and the face value of
the notes did not equal the fair market value of the
properties transferred.  The court held that, under I.R.C. §
2603(a), because the decedents did not receive the full value
of the transferred properties at the time of the transfers, the
value of the properties was included in the decedents’ gross
estates less the amount of consideration actually received.
Pittman v. U.S., 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,186 (E.D.
N.C. 1994).
VALUATION. The taxpayers, members of one family,
had formed a limited partnership with three classes of
limited partnership interests and each member holding one
type of limited interest as well as a general partner interest.
The partnership owned three parcels of real estate. The three
parcels were transferred to three separate limited
partnerships, each with the same set of interests as the
original partnership. Each new partnership had one family
member as limited partner, with the partner contributing the
limited partnership interest in the original partnership to the
new partnership. The partner in each new partnership also
formed a corporation and contributed the general
partnership interest in the original partnership to the
corporation which contributed its stock to the new
partnership in exchange for a general partnership interest.
Thus, each new partnership had one limited partner who
was the director and sole shareholder of a corporate general
partner and each new partnership owned one parcel of real
estate. The new partnerships had terms identical to the
original partnership and were required to contribute to each
other if income was insufficient to meet the distribution
requirements of the partnership agreements. The IRS ruled
that the transaction was only a de minimis change in the
rights and liabilities of the original partners; therefore,
I.R.C. §§ 2701, 2703, 2704 did not apply to the transactions.
Ltr. Rul. 9451050, Sept. 22, 1994.
The taxpayer had loaned money to a corporation in
exchange for promissory notes. In exchange for cancelling
some of those notes, the taxpayer received shares of Class A
noncumulative, convertible preferred stock in the
corporation. The preferred stock had the same rights to
dividends as the common stock, had the same one vote per
share voting rights, was convertible at any time to an equal
number of common stock shares, and received a liquidation
preference of $10 per share, which was subtracted from the
stock’s pro rata share of any liquidation proceeds remaining
after the preference distribution. The taxpayer also owned
common stock. The IRS ruled that the preferred stock was
substantially the same as the common stock since both
classes had the same voting and dividend rights; therefore,
I.R.C. § 2701 did not apply to the transaction. The $10 per
share liquidation preference right was evidently an
insufficient difference for purposes of Section 2701. Ltr.
Rul.  9451051, Sept. 23, 1994.
The decedent had transferred a one-half interest in a
shopping center to the decedent’s children. The other one-
half interest had been sold by third parties in an arm’s-
length sale five months before the transfer to the children.
The court held that the value of the transferred interest
would be based on the sale of the other half. Two of the
decedent’s children obtained a deed from the decedent for
two orange groves. The estate sued the children for return of
the property, based on undue influence, and eventually
recovered the groves. The estate argued that the estate tax
value of the groves was only the value of the claim against
the children and discounted the fair market value by 50
percent. The court ruled that the discount would only be 25
percent because the estate had a good chance of winning the
suit, based on the evidence available to the estate. Estate of
Sharp v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-636.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BAD DEBTS-ALM § 4.03[7].* The taxpayer had made
over $325,000 in loans to a bank in which the taxpayer was
president and an 85 percent owner. The taxpayer claimed a
bad debt deduction for the loan. The court held that the bad
debt was not eligible for a business bad debt deduction
because the taxpayer’s motive in making the loans was to
protect the taxpayer’s investment in the bank and not the
taxpayer’s employment. In re Pierce, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,627 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1994).
C CORPORATIONS
REORGANIZATIONS. The IRS has issued a ruling that
it will not issue advance rulings as to the tax consequences
of Section 368 transactions in which one corporation owns
stock in a second corporation but is not an 80 percent
distributee of the second corporation under I.R.C. § 337(c)
and the two corporations are merged. Rev. Rul. 94-76,
I.R.B. 1994-52.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14].* After being discharged from the taxpayer’s job as
a steel worker for fighting, the taxpayer sued the worker’s
union for breach of duty of fair representation and obtained
a judgment and award against the union. The court held that
the award was excludible from the taxpayer’s income
because the action involved tort-like claims for personal
injury. Banks v. U.S., 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,630
(W.D. Wash. 1994).
EMPLOYEE EXPENSES. The IRS has issued revised
procedures for deemed substantiation of employee expenses
for lodging, meals and other traveling expenses where the
employer provides a per diem allowance allowance for
expenses. The revised procedures also provide an optional
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method for employers and self-employed individuals to
compute the deductible costs of business meals and other
travel expenses. Rev. Proc. 94-77, I.R.B. 1994-52, 51,
superseding, Rev. Proc. 93-50, 1993-2, C.B. 586.
EARNED INCOME CREDIT. The IRS has announced
that the earned income tax credit in 1995 is available for low
income childless workers with income less than $9,000
($306 credit allowed) and that the maximum credit has been
increased to $2,038 with one qualifying child and $2,528
with more than one child. IRS Fact Sheet FS-94-9, Dec.
28, 1994.
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF TAXES. The IRS
has announced proposed regulations imposing a fee of $43
for new agreements for installment payment of delinquent
income taxes and $24 for restructuring or reinstating an
installment agreement. IR 94-118, Dec. 27, 1994.
LETTER RULINGS. The IRS has issued its annual list
of procedures for furnishing technical advice to District
Directors and Chiefs, Appeals Offices. Rev. Proc. 95-2,
I.R.B. 1995-1, 64.
    The IRS has issued its annual list of tax issues for which
the IRS will not give advance rulings or determination
letters. Rev. Proc. 95-3, I.R.B. 1995-1, 85.
The IRS has issued procedures for issuing determination
letters on the qualified status of employee plans under
Sections 401(a), 403(a), 409 and 4975(e)(7). Rev. Proc. 95-
6, I.R.B. 1995-1, 153.
The IRS has issued revised fee schedules for issuing
determination letters on the qualified status of employee
plans under Sections 401(a), 403(a), 409 and 4975(e)(7).
Rev. Proc. 95-8, I.R.B. 1995-1, 187.
MILEAGE DEDUCTION. The standard mileage rate
for 1995 is 30 cents per mile for business use, 12 cents per
mile for charitable use and 9 cents per mile for medical and
moving expense use. Rev. Proc. 94-73, I.R.B. 1994-52, 23.
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[3].*
Effective for taxable years beginning after December 31,
1993, rental real estate activities in which the taxpayer
materially participates are not subject to limitation under the
passive loss rules if the taxpayer meets eligibility
requirements relating to real property trades or businesses in
which the taxpayer performs services. See I.R.C. §
469(c)(7).  An individual meets the requirements if (a) more
than one-half of the personal services the taxpayer performs
in trades or businesses during the taxable year are performed
in real property trades or businesses in which the taxpayer
materially participates and (b) the taxpayer performs more
than 750 hours of services during the taxable year in real
property trades or businesses in which the taxpayer
materially participates.  See I.R.C. § 469(c)(7)(B).  A “real
property trade or business” includes any real property
development, redevelopment, construction, reconstruction,
acquisition, conversion, rental, operation, management,
leasing, or brokerage trade or business. See I.R.C. §
469(c)(7)(C). The IRS has announced proposed regulations
implementing these rules. Jan. 10, 1995.
Under Treas. Reg. § 1.469-2T(c)(3)(ii)(A), if a member
of a passthrough entity, such as a partnership or S
corporation, sells, exchanges or otherwise disposes of an
interest in the entity, a ratable portion of the gain or loss
recognized from the transfer of the interest in the entity is
allocated to each activity of the entity in order to determine
how much of the gain or loss is attributable to passive
activities. The IRS has issued a ruling that if a partner or
member of an S corporation receives a distribution in excess
of the member’s basis in the entity, the excess is to be
treated as a sale or exchange of an interest in the entity for
purposes of the passive activity rule of Treas. Reg. § 1.469-
2T(c)(3)(ii)(A). Rev. Rul. 95-5, I.R.B. 1995-2.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
CONTRIBUTIONS. The IRS has adopted as final
regulations relating to the allocation of built-in gain or loss
in property to the partner who contributed the property. In
general, the regulations require the use of a reasonable
allocation method which takes into account the variation
between the adjusted tax basis of the property and its fair
market value. The regulations provide methods considered
reasonable but allow taxpayers to use another method if,
under the facts and circumstances, the method is reasonable.
The regulations specifically define as unreasonable an
allocation method which increases or decreases the
property's basis or where the partnership creates tax
allocations of income, gain, loss or deduction independent
of allocations affecting book capital accounts. The new
regulations provide guidance for using the remedial
allocation method and for allocation regarding securities and
similar investments.   59 Fed. Reg. 66724 (Dec. 28, 1994).
DEFINITION. The IRS has adopted as final regulations
providing an anti-abuse rule which allows the IRS to recast
a transaction involving a partnership as a transaction more
accurately reflecting the true nature of the transaction. 60
Fed. Reg. 23 (Jan. 3, 1995), adding Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2.
The IRS has published a list of all states whose version
of the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act conforms
to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act for purposes of
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2. Rev. Rul. 95-2 I.R.B. 1995-1, 7.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. The IRS has
issued proposed regulations which provide that a member’s
share of income or loss of an LLC is self-employment
income unless (1) a member is not a manager and (2) the
LLC would qualify as a limited partnership under the
limited partnership law of the state in which the LLC is
organized and the member would qualify as a limited
partner.  If a member meets these requirements, the
member’s share of LLC income and loss is not self-
employment income unless the distributions to the member
are guaranteed payments for services. A manager is defined
as a person who, alone or with others, has the continuing
exclusive authority to make the management decisions
necessary to conduct the business of the LLC. If no member
is designated as a manager, all of the members are
managers, even if some members have more authority than
others. 59 Fed. Reg. 67253 (Dec. 29, 1994), adding Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-18.
PENALTIES. The IRS has issued proposed regulations
concerning whether the reliance on the advice of a
professional tax advisor will qualify the taxpayer for
reduction in the accuracy penalty of I.R.C. § 6662. The
proposed regulations require that the advice of the tax
professional be based on all material facts, including the
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taxpayer’s purpose for entering the transaction, and cannot
be based on unreasonable factual or legal assumptions,
including future events. 60 Fed. Reg. 406 (Jan. 4, 1995),
amending Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(g).
PENSION PLANS. The IRS has announced the 1995
cost-of-living adjustments applicable to dollar limitations on
benefits under qualified defined benefit pension plans. IR
94-117, Dec. 23, 1994.
PREPRODUCTION EXPENSES.  The IRS has
adopted as final rules governing the capitalization of
preproduction interest on all real property (includes crops
with a preproductive period of more than two years) and
personal property with a class life of 20 years or more, an
estimated preproduction period of more than two years, or
an estimated production period of more than one year and
an estimated cost of production of more than $1 million.
The amount of interest required to be capitalized is to be
determined under the cost avoidance method.  The rules are
effective for taxable years beginning after December 31,
1994.  59 Fed. Reg. 67187 (Dec. 29, 1991), adding Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.263A(f)-1 through 1.263A(f)-9.
S  CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3[c].*
BUILT-IN GAINS. The IRS has adopted as final
regulations governing the recognition of built-in gains and
losses for S corporations which made an S corporation
election after December 31, 1986.
The regulations provide that I.R.C. §§ 1374(d)(3), (4)
(gain recognized during recognition period is presumed to
be recognized built-in gain or loss) apply only to gain and
loss recognized from sales and exchanges. Treas. Reg. §
1.1374-4(a).
An S corporation’s items of income or deduction
generally are treated as built-in gain or loss if the item
would have been taken into account before the recognition
period by a taxpayer using the accrual method. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1374-4(b).
The regulations provide rules for recognized built-in
gain or loss for (1) positive and negative income
adjustments under I.R.C. § 481(a), (2) cancellation of
indebtedness income and bad debt deductions, (3) income
from sales or exchanges reported under the installment
method, and (5) the distributive share of partnership items.
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1374-4(c) through (h).
The regulations provide rules for determining recognized
built-in gain and loss when an S corporation holds an
interest in a partnership. Treas. Reg. § 1.1374-4(h). 59 Fed.
Reg. 66458 (Dec. 27, 1994).
SHAREHOLDER BASIS. The taxpayer owned 96
percent of a C corporation with the taxpayer’s spouse. The
taxpayer loaned $34,000 to the C corporation for product
development. The taxpayer and spouse then established an S
corporation to sell the product developed by the C
corporation. The S corporation paid the C corporation for
the services by a promissory note. The promissory note was
extinguished when the S corporation agreed to assume the C
corporation’s liability to the taxpayer. The court held that
the taxpayer could not add the amount of the loan to the
taxpayer’s basis in the S corporation because the loan was
between the taxpayer and the C corporation. Hitchins v.
Comm’r, 103 T.C. No. 40 (1994).
SOCIAL SECURITY TAX. The IRS has issued
guidelines in question and answer form for determining
when tip income is subject to FICA tax and withholding.
Rev. Rul. 95-7, I.R.B. 1995-4.
NEGLIGENCE
AERIAL SPRAYING . The plaintiff leased land
neighboring land planted in soybeans. The plaintiff grew
watermelons which were healthy until two weeks after the
defendant sprayed the soybean fields with herbicides. The
plaintiff claimed that the spraying was done negligently and
caused the loss of the melons, although the plaintiff
presented no soil tests or plant residue tests to support the
allegations. The plaintiff argued that the spraying was an
inherently dangerous activity shifting the burden of proof to
the defendant. The court held that the “inherently dangerous
activity” doctrine was available only to impose liability on a
land owner for the activities of an independent contractor on
the owner’s land. The plaintiff also argued that the trial
court’s ruling in favor of the defendant was against the
weight of the evidence because under the “sudden onset
doctrine.” the spraying had to have caused the loss of the
melons. The court held that the “sudden onset doctrine” did
not apply because the plaintiff’s melons did not die until
two weeks after the spraying and the plaintiff did not show
that the spraying was negligently performed.  In addition,
the court noted that several other explanations for the death
of the melons were presented at trial, including carryover of
herbicide from the plaintiff’s own spraying on the previous
year’s soybean crop. McLain v. Johnson, 885 S.W.2d 345
(Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
PERFECTION. The debtors had granted to the plaintiff
a security interest in “all crops growing or to be grown.”
The financing statement was filed in Fulton county where
the debtors had farm land on which crops were grown. The
debtors also grew crops on farm land in Henry county and
one crop was sold during the debtors’ bankruptcy case. The
plaintiff claimed a priority security interest in the crops
under the Fulton county filed security agreement. Another
creditor and the bankruptcy trustee, the defendant, objected
to the plaintiff’s security interest, arguing that the security
interest was not perfected because the financing statement
did not describe any land in Henry county and because the
financing statement was not filed in Henry county. The
court held that the security interest was not perfected
because the financing statement was not filed in the county
where the crops were grown as required by Ohio Rev. Code
§ 1309.38(A)(2) for security interests in crops growing or to
be grown. The court did not discuss the requirement for
description of the land on which the crops were grown.
Farm Credit Services v. Nofzinger, 642 N.E.2d 430 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1994).
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TRESPASS
DAMAGES . The defendant cooperative electric
company had electric lines running over the plaintiff’s
property to provide electrical service to the plaintiff. The
defendant entered onto the plaintiff’s property and trimmed
three trees with branches in the lanes. The plaintiff sued for
excess trimming of the trees. The defendant argued that the
actual damages were to be based upon the loss of value of
the land and objected to the trial court’s instructions which
allowed the jury to base the damages on either the cost of
replacement of the trees, the loss of shade or ornamental
value of the trees, or the loss of aesthetic value of the trees.
The plaintiff presented evidence of methods of appraisal of
damaged trees approved by the Council of Tree and
Landscape Appraisers which is accepted and distributed by
the U.S.D.A. through the Cooperative Extension Service.
The court held that the jury instruction was proper and that
the plaintiff provided sufficient evidence of an appraisal
method for use by the jury. The defendant objected to the
award of treble damages because the defendant believed
that it was on the property with the good faith belief that it
had an easement to trim tree branches in the wires. The
court held that S. D. Cent. Laws § 21-3-10 did not provide
any “good faith” exception to allowing treble damages for
wrongful injury to trees. Wallahan v. Black Hills Elec.
Co-op., Inc., 523 N.W.2d 417 (S.D. 1994).
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $35
each in 1995.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$5.75 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
ISSUE INDEX
Adverse Possession
Hostile use 18
Bankruptcy
General
Avoidable transfers 18
Estate property 18
Executory contracts 18
Exemptions
  Avoidable liens 19
  Household goods 19
Trustee fee 19
Chapter 11
Absolute priority rule 19
Federal taxation
Claims 19
Contracts
Breach 19
Pasture lease 20
Federal Agricultural Programs
Peanuts 20
Rural development 20
Federal Estate and Gift Tax
Generation skipping transfers 20
Gift 20
Transfers with retained interests 21
Valuation 21
Federal Income Taxation
Bad debts 21
C corporations
Reorganizations 21
Court awards and settlements 21
Employee expenses 21
Earned income credit 22
Installment payment of taxes 22
Letter rulings 22
Mileage deduction 22
Passive activity losses 122
Partnerships
Contributions  22
Definition 22
Limited liability companies 22
Penalties 22
 Pension plans 23
Preproduction expenses 23
S corporations
Built-in gains 23
Shareholder basis 23
Social security tax 23
Negligence
Aerial spraying 23
Secured Transactions
Perfection 23
Trespass
Damages 24
